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Résumé
Comment la stratégie chinoise, “ commerce et non pas assistanat ”, se 
transforme en un acte de charité.
Ces dernières années, la Chine a accru ses investissements en Afrique et son modèle “Trade not 
Aid” semble être la meilleure prestation de l’assistance durable. En passant en revue l’histoire 
de l’aide chinoise à l’Afrique, en examinant les relations interraciales, et en déconstruisant les 
modèles contemporains de l’aide, l’auteur fait valoir que, du moins en termes de tentatives 
agricoles, l’approche actuelle de la Chine ressemble à du colonialisme. 
Abstract
In recent years, China has increased investments in Africa and its “Trade Not Aid” model appears 
to be the best delivery of sustainable assistance. By reviewing the history of Chinese aid to Africa, 
examining race-relations literature, and deconstructing contemporary models of aid, the author 
argues that, at least in terms of agricultural endeavors, China’s current approach resembles the 
colonialism that it once sought to disassemble.
There have been many arguments against traditional patterns of aid to Africa. In 2009, Dambisa Moyo provided one of the most recent and promi-
nent rationales, asserting that trade-based economic relationships encou-
rage investment, production, as well as technical knowledge exchange, 
which therefore provides the effectiveness and sustainability that are lacking 
in traditional aid projects.1 This “ Trade Not Aid ” approach has become 
synonymous with contemporary China-Africa economic relations, and as 
it enhances its investments in Africa, China is also winning Moyo’s praise 
as Africa’s best friend.2 Nonetheless, a closer inspection of their relationship 
reveals that, at least in terms of agricultural investment, China’s strategy is 
not as radical of a departure from colonialism as the existing literature would 
suggest. 
This paper takes Li Li’s Jonken Farm situated in Moyo’s home — Zambia 
— as a case study to explore the dichotomy between perceptions of aid 
providers and recipients. Li and her husband Wang Chi built Jonken Farm in 
1992. Their story first became known in a 2004 television interview,3 and after 
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Li assumed the management of the 3573-hectare farm when Wang passed 
away in 2005, she became a national celebrity in China. Beijing crowned 
Li with titles such as “the Chinese who touches Africa the most”, “National 
Heroine”, and “Distinguished Communist.” She was also mentioned in two 
important English-language publications on the Sino-African relationship. 
Basing herself on Jonken, Deborah Brautigam concludes that Li’s private 
investment generates profit as well as employment opportunities for locals.4 
Serge Michel and Michel Beuret add that trade-based relationships buffer 
interracial discontent in ways aid does not; despite recent anti-Chinese 
revolts in Zambia, they find that Jonken is described as “a perfect example 
of the cooperation between China and Zambia”5.
I deconstruct the Jonken story in the context of Beijing’s agricultural 
endeavors in Africa since 1960. Chinese assistance to Africa began with 
altruistic roots, but these have been lost over time even though Chinese 
media frames investments as “help” to its former aid recipients so it appears 
that China has not discontinued any aid. While Chinese perceive the 
contemporary business relationships as assistance, however, “aid” recipients 
often do not; while Beijing paints Li as a national hero, Zambians find her a 
bigoted and harsh. Despite investments being more efficient than traditional 
forms of aid, the racism that has accompanied the capitalism foretells grave 
risks in the future of Sino-African relations.
Altruism
Origins of Chinese Agricultural Aid to Africa
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, its 
communist outlook viewed commercial activities as acts of capitalist and 
colonialist oppression. The PRC consequently sought to bring class coope-
ration onto the international stage. Prior to 1949, Chinese workers were paid 
to work with Africans to plant cash crops for colonialists, who made their 
fortunes exploiting these laborers. In this way, capitalism and colonialism 
oppressed both Chinese and Africans, and thus set the foundation for dialo-
gue between Communist China and Africa. 
The PRC joined the race to aid Africa around 1960. Due to pressures 
from Moscow, Washington, and the un-surrendering Republic of China on 
Taiwan (hereafter “ROC” or “Taiwan”), Beijing had to give aid generously to 
newly independent African states in exchange for international support. The 
“mutual benefit” principle of which Zhou Enlai spoke in 1963 guided the Sino-
Africa relationship6 for many years and can be understood as a framework 
wherein China traded economic resources for political gains. 
Among the economic benefits China delivered to Africa, agricultural 
aid was the most critical for Africa’s long-term development. The colonia-
list cash-crop strategy crippled sub-Saharan Africa by making it “produce 
what it does not consume […] and consume what it does not produce.”7 
Dependence on imported food was therefore not only a vestige of colonia-
lism, but a barrier to independence for many African states. A steady domes-
tic food supply and development thus went hand-in-hand: Africa would 
not make sufficient progress until it ameliorated its agricultural productivity 
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because “the attainment of food security is at the very core of the quest 
for sustainable development on the African continent”8. China therefore 
prioritized agricultural aid to Africa for this was the way to assist African aid 
recipients in combating class inequalities.
Genuine Help and Appreciation
Chinese endeavors to improve Africa’s food supply were first demons-
trated on large farms and research centers for the promotion of agricultural 
techniques. Although both were designed to enhance food production, 
building large farms required heavy infrastructural investments, involved 
more qualified technicians, and benefitted more local people financially 
and technically. Since 1959, China has dispatched roughly 10,000 techni-
cians to help convert 70,000 hectares of wasteland into farmland. This feat, 
which included 16 irrigation projects comprising dams, reservoirs, ditches, and 
pump stations, was essentially completed by the late 1970s. This wasteland 
transformation was highly impressive and furthered the PRC’s class solidarity 
mission for “large farms established with Chinese aid played a crucial role in 
solving local grain shortages and advancing local economies.”9 
In addition to food, large farms also generated skilled peasants and 
plentiful harvests, and the associated land exploration and infrastructure-
building augmented employment rates. Since large farms produced signi-
ficant visual and economic results, they attracted politicians’ praise for 
Chinese food supply solutions and confirmed the strength of the Sino-African 
friendship. Locals, too, were seen to be grateful: reports recount stories of 
African peasants praising the Chinese through song and dance, with some 
even kneeling before Chinese-constructed buildings to thank the Chinese 
for saving their lives.10
Unfortunately, most of these projects were unsustainable because 
once these projects were transferred to locals, cultural, political, or social 
barriers caused the majority to deteriorate substantially. For example, the 
Afefi Project in Ghana was a 900-hectare rice project that included a deli-
cate irrigation system and a reservoir. When Chinese technicians left, without 
continual financial and technical support, the farm reverted to its traditional 
slash-and-burn cultivation method which yields far fewer crops.11 
Although such efficiency problems existed, Beijing’s attitude was surpri-
singly unselfish. Chinese assistance during the early period was marked by 
altruism, a common sentiment amongst the Chinese who worked in Africa. 
Chinese technicians paid their own living expenses because anything less 
was not philanthropic. After seeing that the Liberian economy depended 
on exporting primary resources, a Chinese diplomat to Liberia sighed with 
emotion and asked, “If all money flows to foreigners, how can Liberians gain 
real independence and enjoy a decent quality of life?”12 A former Chinese 
ambassador to Mali remembered that Malians love tea, so Chinese techni-
cians were dispatched to teach them how to plant tea even though helping 
the Malian economy meant that China would lose its export market.13 
The technicians’ sentiments and efforts did not go unnoticed by aid 
recipients. PRC diplomats recall that Chinese were respected everywhere. 
During the Ugandan civil war, for instance, detained PRC diplomats were 
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unable to communicate with the militia in their local dialect, but as soon as 
they mentioned Kibimba, a 600-hectre PRC-assisted farm, the militia imme-
diately “switched to a smile and released [the diplomats].”14 
Political and Economic Benefits
Although agricultural aid was economically inefficient, Mao’s political 
ideals of Communism and international altruism prevailed in the PRC’s assis-
tance strategy. In many aspects of agricultural assistance, China prioritized 
aid recipients’ interests by helping ease host governments’ financial burdens 
and dedicating itself to dismantling the vestiges of colonial dependence. 
Labor and capital investments in large farms and lucrative harvests for locals 
demonstrated China’s heartfelt efforts and therefore consolidated political 
alliances and friendships. 
Aid recipients also reaped some lasting economic gain. For starters, not 
all Chinese assisted farms reverted to nothing. A few remained functional, 
though less lucrative than they once were. For instance, Brautigam found a 
56-hectre farm in Sierra Leone’s Lambayama that the PRC created 30 years 
ago that still reaps two harvests a year. Aside from supporting 150 peasants, 
this farm helped many refugees during the civil war. The local agricultural 
office still “appreciate[s] this kind of technical assistance [because] this area 
was developed long ago, and we are still benefiting.”15 In addition to directly 
helping peasants through infrastructural development, Chinese aid made 
conditions more attractive to private investments. The above-mentioned 
Kibimba project suffered great losses after the local government took over, 
but the Chinese-laid infrastructure attracted a British company that replaced 
the management and allowed this farm to produce enough rice to market.16 
Although there are many criticisms of aid efficiency prior to the 1980s, some 
scholars argue that “[o]f all the fields involving Sino-African technical coope-
ration, the best results have been seen in agriculture.”17
The Evolution of China’s Aid to Africa
In the 1980s, capitalism replaced Mao’s strict communism when the 
PRC internally adopted a capitalist approach to economic development. 
The main reason for downsizing assistance projects was not poor efficiency 
but China’s domestic financial needs. When Zhao Ziyang reiterated the 
“mutual benefit” principle in 1982, he implied that China now required more 
financial returns and therefore included an economic connotation to Zhou 
Enlai’s 1963 definition of “mutual benefit”.
The stabilizing of the PRC’s international status was another reason 
for the PRC to change its conception of assistance. By the 1980s, Beijing’s 
relationship with Moscow was less tense, Washington had recognized Beijing 
as the sole representation of China, and the PRC had been one of five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council for nearly a decade. The 
PRC could now “join decision-making in global politics, and thus acquire 
favorable conditions in the world market.”18 China was eager to reduce its 
aid budget, but it could not simply terminate assistance for political conside-
rations. It therefore resolved to diminish the scale of assistance but maintain 
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the existing number of projects, and thus the policy decision was taken to 
“switch from productive projects to monument building” as well as to “spend 
less and diversify”19
Architectural projects became the new trend in spite of aid recipients’ 
preferences. “We are not interested in stadiums,”20 summarized Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni, because monuments, such as conference 
centers, congressional buildings, and stadiums offer little economic produc-
tivity. Compared with agricultural assistance, however, construction projects 
are far more sustainable and recognizable from the aid provider’s perspec-
tive. Erecting a building is a one-time expenditure that stands as an incon-
testable reminder of a major contribution. Due to the impressive political and 
visual effects of architectural infrastructure, numerous African states have 
consequently accepted these manifestations of China’s friendship despite 
sentiments akin to Museveni’s. 
In addition to guaranteeing the sustainability and visibility of its contri-
butions, construction projects offer China the bonus of reaping returns in 
subcontracts. Architectural projects allow Beijing to introduce Chinese 
construction-related companies into Africa through sub-contracting bids. 
Because Chinese bids are often the most affordable ones, they usually win 
the contract and such business relationships have garnered praise as a new 
type of Sino-African Cooperation. For example, many Chinese companies 
were introduced to Zaire through a $12 million USD project for Mobutu Sese 
Seko’s Presidential Villa. Zaire’s ex-Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo welcomed 
Chinese companies because Chinese bidders would undercut other conten-
ders and decrease his construction project spending. Chinese bids thus have 
a monetary effect “similar to aid” and have been considered a “new type 
of cooperation.”21
Unlike architectural projects, agricultural programs are mostly set in the 
countryside and are therefore accessible to general contractors. Without 
profits, Chinese aid focused on low-cost agricultural projects, and many 
costs were reapportioned to recipients. Housing, which PRC technicians 
once considered an aid provider’s expenditure, became a required reci-
pient state expense. Under the new “spend less and diversify” aid framework, 
China only financed light equipment, encouraged recipient states to send 
technicians to study agriculture in China, and prioritized “educational agri-
cultural demonstration centers”22 without appearing to be giving any less 
assistance. 
Such educational centers are less expensive to maintain than assis-
tance farms and they imply the end of China’s commitment to improve 
infrastructure for Africa’s agriculture. These centers cost significantly less to 
maintain, but have the benefit of allowing Chinese officials to boast about 
the number of ongoing projects and reap the political effects. During the 
1980s, China still offered agricultural assistance to more than 20 countries, 
but most of the 40 projects were small in scale and had few were capable 
of research or exploration.23
Small agricultural centers naturally engender fewer economic bene-
fits and in this way China’s policy shift results in less effective agricultural 
assistance and a further departure from its original objective to eradicate 
vestiges of colonialism in Africa. Few sources, however, admit this decline 
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in productivity. For instance, since the 1980s, Chinese technicians in central 
Africa have been working on Mpoko and Boyali which the Chinese media 
has nicknamed “little Jiang-Nan” or “little Yangtze Delta,” after China’s histo-
ric rice granary. But, the real efficiency of these agricultural centers is far from 
what the media reports. Chinese experts have been teaching locals new 
technologies at Mpoko and Boyali for three decades but there has been 
little impact; peasants still prefer traditional slash-and-burn methods. An inter-
nal report to the Department of Agriculture of Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region conveys that these two centers “drift along, running themselves year 
after year at a very low standard.”24 Without large investments to overhaul 
the infrastructure, these two education-oriented farms have much fewer 
chances of surviving than large farms like the famed Kibimba which saved 
Chinese diplomats in Uganda. 
The effects of China’s overall ideological shift are most manifest in Sao 
Tome and Principe where China sent a Shanxi-based construction corpo-
ration to erect a congressional building in the late 1980s. Sao Tome and 
Principe terminated its relationship with China in 1997, but the congressional 
building still stands today and the Shanxi construction company continues 
to bid on local contracts. Apart from the edifice, locals remember China for 
the medical aid teams whose doctors once stole medicine from the Sao 
Tome and Principe state-funded hospital to sell on the side. Few know that 
after China adopted its “spend less and diversify” approach, China built a 
rice-planting technical center in Diogo Nunes, a highly-visible field located 
beside the international airport. Although Chinese diplomats praised the 
land’s arability,25 China found no market incentives to continue technical 
projects and closed the center after five years. Without significant invest-
ments in the form of machinery or an irrigation system, this 20-hectre farm 
and rice-husking plant soon reverted to an overgrown field. 
The Chinese experience in Sao Tome and Principe illustrates how a 
project’s size matters for political effect and that monetary returns motivate 
aid providers. Agricultural projects do not attract sustainable attention 
without being sizeable and profitable; without the budget or desire to invest 
heavily in potentially unsustainable low-visibility projects, China’s altruistic aid 
objectives and agricultural assistance programs are historical bygones.
 Supported by the media, unprofitable agricultural assistance continues 
to exist, but it is no longer a priority for them to be centers for sustainable 
agricultural technical knowledge exchanges. Despite Guinean President 
Lansana Conté’s praise for the Chinese for transforming the “worn-out 
piece of land”26 near his hometown into the Koba Farm, Guinean agricultural 
projects are steadily declining. China continues to build regional agricultural 
centers to educate locals on intensive farming techniques, but these centers 
are on the path to extinction. In 1992, China re-built an agricultural promotion 
center in Kindia and dispatched technicians to teach rice-planting, maize-
planting, and mechanical maintenance skills to Guineans. Without follow-
up assistance, the jungle reappropriated this center in 1999. Bafing-Tolo, an 
educational center worth $1 million USD, was built in 1996 and ceased to 
function within the year.27 
Although initially reluctant to provide agricultural aid to Africa, China 
realized through the course of the 1990s that helping Africa could offer desi-
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rable returns. The success of the Koba Farm is largely related to Chinese 
technicians being motivated by profit. Unlike “promotion centers,” Koba is 
run by a Chinese state-owned enterprise whose objective is to sell food in 
Guinea. Since 1997, Koba received 100 million RMB in investments and has 
received a number of experts wishing to explore this 1800-hectre farm. In 
addition to the monetary returns, Koba also renders political dividends. Conté 
undoubtedly praised Chinese investments in his hometown to consolidate 
his political support. China, too, reaps political clout from the publicity of 
Koba as an aid project. The Chinese media makes no mention that Koba 
is profit-oriented. Instead, this is a farm which “displays Chinese national 
spirit,” represents “Sino-Africa cooperation,” wins “locals’ respect,” provides 
300 job opportunities worth $20,000 USD, and “helps resolve Guinea’s food 
problem”.28
Help Versus Aid
Small agricultural demonstration centers generate little economic or 
political return, while large farms risk being unfruitful long-term investments for 
any number of reasons.29 As a solution, the Chinese reduced local influences 
to manual labor and left supervision and management to investors, much like 
the colonial division of labor. Both administrations demonstrate that capita-
lism works: a specialized skills-set can create abundant harvests which encou-
rage sustainable management. Since Chinese-stimulated crops feed into the 
domestic market, China is technically alleviating Africa’s food problem even 
though profits go to Chinese firms, not nationals of the aid recipient. 
Without too much publicity on the indirect relationship between its 
investments and assistance, China enjoys the image of a facilitator of the 
“Trade Not Aid” movement. As in English, the Chinese verbs for “help” and 
“aid” are easily confused because both indicate altruistic activities toward a 
third party. Technically, Chinese officials and media use “help” (bangzhu) to 
describe the performance of Chinese agricultural firms in Africa and reserve 
“aid” (yuanzhu) for traditional government-funded projects, but these terms 
are rarely distinguished in common parlance. What is more noticeable is that 
“colonialism” and “capitalism,” on the other hand, are terms reserved for 
Western private investment in Africa. As a result, Western farming investments 
are “colonialist” and “capitalist” because they exploit Africa for profit, but 
Chinese agricultural investments are seen as “help” to Africa because they 
improve food supply, albeit indirectly. 
By definition, private investment is not aid and therefore cannot 
perfectly demonstrate China’s friendship towards Africa, so China still main-
tains a number of assistance projects for political appearances. In 2006, China 
committed to establishing 10 demonstration centers and sending 100 elite 
technicians to Africa. Even though this team of elite technicians may seem to 
be a new element of the PRC assistance package, China’s approach to aid 
has not changed since the 1980s and these technicians still form part of its 
“downsize and diversify” policy. Each elite technician costs about $1900-2100 
USD a month and is dispatched for only one year in the host country30. For 
$2.4 million USD, China has purchased the impression of generously increasing 
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aid to Africa, but it is not in actuality committing to sustainable programs to 
help Africa break away from its colonial economy. 
As to be expected, the technicians faced numerous budgetary limi-
tations and so many were quite inactive during their assistance assignments 
and even lied in their activity reports31. Since August 2009, they have chan-
neled their energies into a web forum and produced new opinions on aid 
which have begun to attract widespread and academic attention32. Geng 
Naili, an elite agricultural envoy to Côte d’Ivoire uploaded a highly-praised 
report titled “How to Better Execute China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation”. 
He opines that the Chinese government should use economic incentives to 
attract 160,000-320,000 Chinese peasants to Côte d’Ivoire to effect technical 
knowledge exchange to Ivorians and resolve the food supply problem; as a 
bonus, the Chinese peasants would make a fortune.33 This is not the first time 
Chinese academics have considered sending farmers to help Africa,34 but 
Geng’s paper attracted Dr. Hao Feng, an elite agricultural envoy to Tanzania. 
Feng agrees wholeheartedly with Geng that “the best way to settle Africa’s 
agricultural backwardness is to attract Chinese investors and peasants.”35 To 
help Geng’s message reach a broader audience, Hao encouraged him to 
submit his paper to South China Agriculture, an academic journal of which Hao 
is the director.36 I am not sure if Geng’s paper is published South China Agriculture 
as of yet, but Geng has promulgated his views on another popular Chinese 
website. His second piece bears a self-explanatory title : “[Chinese] Peasant 
Entrepreneurs Should Emigrate to Africa Where Land is Abundant, People 
are Lazy, and Food Prices are Good. All [Chinese] Peasants Will Become 
Technicians in Africa.”37
Racism
Such colonialist and racist pronouncements by elite technicians 
support Philip Snow’s analysis that Chinese “were no freer of original sin than 
the Europeans or Americans.”38 Chinese traditionally discriminated against 
all ethnic groups outside of China. External states or peoples beyond the 
Chinese cultural periphery were viewed as inferior and barbaric. In the 
twelfth-century, Zhu Yu’s “Pingzhou Ketan” depicted black people eating raw 
food. White “barbarians” were considered slightly superior to blacks because 
at least they cooked their food.39 During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, China 
was more open to the West and was exposed to the white enslavement 
of blacks. Henceforth, “black barbarians” were also called “black slaves” 
(heinu), “devil slaves” (guinu), and “barbarian devils” (fangui)40 and this 
consolidated Africans as the lowest caste in Chinese worldviews. 
The increase in conflicts between China and the West in the late 
nineteenth-century changed the Chinese impression of whites as barbaric, 
but there was no similar socio-economic force to temper the Chinese pers-
pective of blacks. Worse, when Darwinism became popular in China, some 
reform-minded scholars adopted this theory and labeled blacks as inferior. 
Lian Qichao found Africans lustful of white women, slavish, backward, lazy, 
and dimwitted41. Yan Fu, who introduced Darwin’s Natural Selection to China, 
ranked Africans the lowest race of human beings.42 Kang Youwei ranked 
whites as the best race and wished to ameliorate all others by whitening 
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darker races through dietary change, migration, and intermarriage. Kang 
was optimistic about improving yellow-skinned people but not blacks and 
proposed sterilization as an alternate solution because “the progress of a 
beautiful race should not be obstructed by bad black seeds.”43
Chinese have perceived Africans as dimwitted, lazy, fierce, and 
odiferous44, but in the early years of the PRC, communism masked China’s 
racism and lent the Sino-Africa relationship a common identity in images of 
backwardness. To quote Mao, “[Westerners] say we Chinese are useless, we 
colored people are useless, we are dirty, and we are not elegant. We seem 
to be the same as Africans.”45 Both of the PRC’s major enemies at the time, 
Washington and Moscow, were white, so Chinese ignored their own identity 
and advocated for “us blacks to stick together against the white race.”46 
Even under Mao’s vision of altruistic communism and harmonious 
Sino-African relations, however, racial discrimination against blacks was still 
rampant. Diplomats and technicians in Africa were reluctant to mingle with 
Africans,47 and Chinese doctors suspected that Africans did not wash them-
selves regularly.48 Chinese teachers generally perceived African students to 
be “uncultured, forgetful, and lazy.”49 Even when Beijing was at the peak of 
its altruistic communism and the state required giving Africans exceptional 
hospitality, there were several African protests against Chinese racism in 
Beijing. A collective hunger strike in March 1962 resulted in 96 of 118 African 
students being sent home.50 
In the post-Mao era, the state largely withdrew from every aspect 
of society, so Africans were not as “equal” as before. Zhao Ziyang, who 
proposed the 1982 “mutual-benefit” policy toward Africa, wished to restore 
China’s greatness by foregoing the Third World and aligning China with the 
West. This shift renewed the rhetoric of Chinese superiority over Africans: 
China’s destiny lies with the progressive West rather than with backward 
peoples.51 When the reform started, racial riots and public demonstrations 
occurred in Shanghai in 1979 and 1980; Nanjing in 1979, 1980, 1988, and 1989; 
Tianjin in 1986 and 1989; and Beijing in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 
and 1989.52 In these demonstrations and riots, Africans were described as 
inferior, backward, and uncivilized, so it was not wrong to call Africans “Black 
Devils” (hei gui)53 or to condone “killing the Black Devils” (sha hei gui).54 Two 
quotes from Chinese demonstrators capture this unabashed racism during 
this formative period of Sino-African relations: “we are walking towards a 
great future on a broad road to the advanced and civilized world, but we 
will not feed all of uncultured Africa with the results of our efforts or allow any 
Negros to hang about our universities to disturb Chinese girls,”55 and “blacks 
are just apes from trees who should go back to their own country and keep 
their diseased and lazy selves at home.”56
As Malcolm X said, “You can’t have capitalism without racism.” 
When economic reform turned the PRC’s interests toward fortune-hunting, 
Africa’s economic deficiencies no longer stimulated Chinese altruism, but 
strengthened Chinese racism. Kang Youwei’s concerns about bad black 
seeds” resurfaced with special attention to the male-female relationship. 
The relationship between Chinese women and African men has attracted 
more attention. Many of the conflicts in the 1980s resulted from concerns 
about Africans “polluting Chinese society with their relations with Chinese 
10 How China’s “ Trade Not Aid ” Strategy Became Construed As Charitable Help
women,”57 unlike the attitude towards Chinese-white interracial relationships 
which are taken to symbolize movement towards advancement, civilization, 
and prosperity.58 Today, China Safari finds that Chinese are generally reluctant 
to mix with Africans, and even highly-sexed Chinese male laborers in Africa 
are not attracted to African women.59
The Story of Malawi
The Myth of Helping 50,000
In 2008, Malawi terminated four decades of diplomatic relations with 
Taipei and turned to the PRC. Since Malawi’s relationship with the PRC is 
only two years old, it serves as a unique case study of the PRC’s agricultural 
strategy toward Africa.
The PRC’s aid program seems to be tremendously efficient, especially 
compared to other aid donors such as Taiwan. Taiwan steadily sent agricul-
tural assistance to Malawi for over forty years (1965-2008) but ostensibly did 
not produce the same results as the PRC. In terms of rice projects, Taiwan 
built and managed 15 large irrigated paddy rice projects which totaled 
roughly 2300 hectares. The Taiwanese tried to overcome obstacles such as 
poor governance, state enterprise monopolies, mechanical maintenance 
challenges, and learning Chichewa dialect to write a technical manual for 
local farmers, and finally estimated that these irrigation projects benefitted 
approximately 7799 Malawians.60
Meanwhile, within two years, the PRC has “benefitted 50,000 Malawian 
peasants” in Balaka with a $25 million USD cotton project. Its opening cere-
mony resembled those of old aid projects, with locals appreciating and 
welcoming the Chinese with song and dance while Malawian Vice President 
Joyce Banda explained to the masses that this is why Malawi must “discon-
tinue its friendship with Taiwan.”61 This project is so similar to assistance that 
some academics also mistook this cotton business as development aid.62
Malawi’s transition shows how China’s priorities have moved away from 
agricultural aid. In old times, whenever the PRC replaced the ROC in an 
African state, Beijing’s priority was to manage Taiwan-managed farms so 
that food production would not be affected by politics. PRC diplomats prou-
dly remember how eagerly they took over the projects in Dahomey, Sierra 
Leone, and Lesotho,63 where they sought to ensure food security and delink 
Africa from its colonial economic ties. When Malawi switched camps in 2008, 
Beijing did not take over any of Taiwan’s agricultural assistance because 
food production in Malawi has never been profitable. Cotton, on the other 
hand, has been a competitive resource since colonial times. Beijing is not 
interested in agricultural assistance but Malawi is an agrarian society, so 
cotton production became a propaganda tool. Since the Chinese company 
purchases cotton from peasants, Beijing claims to “help eliminate Malawi’s 
poverty.”64
In terms of economic theory, Beijing is helping Malawi’s situation, but 
Malawians may not agree that they have been helped. China’s Malawi 
Cotton Company (a joint venture of Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Industrial 
Company and China Color-Cotton Group) arrived to Balaka in 2008 to join 
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two other British companies in the cotton market. When Chinese first arrived, 
they offered 90-100 Kwacha per kilogram of cotton, so through the Balaka 
farmer’s association, Malawi Cotton Company soon contracted with 50,000 
peasants. They received Chinese seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides in the form 
of a loan which the company would deduct from the following year’s cotton 
harvest. In 2009, the Chinese offered 42 Kwacha per kilogram of cotton, 
which was the market price, no higher than the other two British companies, 
and lower than the nationally regulated price of 70 Kwacha per kilogram. 
Peasants felt cheated so many refused to sell their cotton to Malawi Cotton 
Company. 
All credit and loan measures are done through local farmer associa-
tions. Malawian farmers and this Malawi Cotton Company have no direct 
contact with one another; the company representatives in Balaka do not 
even know which farmers have contracted with them. Their relationship is 
a strict transaction: no personal care, no skills training, just a sum of money 
which does not cover living costs. As in colonial times, this economic 
framework trades cash crops for food; while the Chinese feel like they are 
helping Africans, Malawian peasants feel exploited. 
Problems of Business-Based “Help”
Up to now, apart from taking over Taiwan’s non-agricultural aid 
(Muzuzu hospital and a road between Karonga and Chitipa), assistance to 
Malawi consists mainly of two construction projects in Lilongwe. The first is 
a gift, a parliament building worth $40 million USD, contracted to an Anhui 
state-owned enterprise. The second is a concession loan from China’s Export-
Import Bank for a conference center worth $90 million USD, contracted to a 
Shanghai state-owned enterprise. Besides infrastructure, there are 20 young 
volunteer aid ambassadors stationed in Lilongwe. They are mostly recent 
graduates in their early twenties whose diplomatic duties include playing 
ping pong, promoting Chinese medicine, and Chinese language exchan-
ges.65 Few PRC endeavors relate to food security except for four horticultural 
volunteers conducting peripheral research in two agricultural institutions.
The greater impact on Malawians is the corresponding influx of Chinese 
businesses to Malawian cities and the Malawian countryside whose low-
quality but cheap products and questionable business practices have driven 
out local enterprises. Most Chinese businesspeople in Malawi are extremely 
reluctant to integrate into local society. Being mostly unreligious and not 
fluent in the local languages, Chinese businesspeople are commonly ignorant 
of local laws and customs and tend to settle issues using the corrupt methods 
with which they are familiar in China. Negative reports regarding Chinese 
are everywhere, such as money laundering, illegal transport of foreign 
currency, bribery of officials, violence against Malawian employees, and 
sale of sexual organs.66 Newly arrived Chinese care so little about Malawian 
law that the PRC embassy must warn businesspeople to “remember, this is 
their country.”67
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Whenever there is a report on China, Malawians complain about discri-
mination and exploitation at the hands of Chinese. But, because Chinese 
consider their sales a form of assistance, they feel they deserve the locals’ 
appreciation, so they respond harshly by calling Malawians “black dogs”68 
who would be “naked in the streets without the hard-working Chinese.”69 The 
first PRC envoy Fan Guijin was caught calling Malawians “beggars” three 
months after this new bilateral relationship began”70. The PRC embassy tried 
to emphasize the traditional Sino-African friendship by blaming the “bad 
image of Africa”71 on Western media, but while Chinese believe they are 
helping impoverished Malawians acquire low-priced goods, Malawian custo-
mers and merchants smart from unemployment and racist attitudes. 
Some newly-arrived PRC citizens were advised to introduce themselves 
as Taiwanese for safety concerns.72 But, in fact, Chinese safety concerns 
in Malawi are much less serious than those in neighboring Zambia, where 
Chinese businesses are the targets of many crimes and where Chinese 
private enterprises have provoked the ire of locals.73 
The Making of Li’s Story
Zambia attracts Chinese investments because its economic policy 
is friendly to foreign investors. Unlike Malawi, for instance, Zambia permits 
foreigners to own land, so in addition to traders, it attracts Chinese business 
farmers. Before Li’s Jonken Farm, the biggest farm was the 667-hectare Sino-
Zambia Friendship Farm. As its name implies, this farm was an assistance 
project, but it was privatized in 1990 because it was unprofitable. Jiangsu 
Agricorp (Jiangsu State Farms Group Corporation) and Zhongguo Agricorp 
(China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation) now hold 
40% and 60% respectively of the Friendship Farm. Under new management, 
the farm soon turned a profit and also benefited China’s political agenda 
as an assistance-oriented farm that provides food for Africa. In 2003, when 
Lee Ruihuan, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, visited this farm with Zambian politicians, the People’s Daily 
reported: 
A group of black men, women, and children dressed in their shiny 
ethnic garb, played their leather drums, danced, and sang […] 
along the side of the road for the arrival of Mr Lee Ruihuan. [….], Lee 
gladly said [….] we must take this farm as a model to encourage 
friendly cooperation between China and Zambia.74 Lee Ruihuan 
also commented “this is China’s tradition of helping poor. This is 
humanity.”75
Chinese commercial activities now are commonly dressed as Sino-
African “cooperation projects.” The PRC embassy in the UK publicized 
the Sino-Zambian Friendship Farm as “a modern farm under cooperative 
management by China and Zambia. Thanks to the application of advanced 
farming technologies, the farm produced a bumper wheat harvest.”76 There 
is no mention of this being a private investment and that Zambia’s “coope-
rative” contribution consists of part-time laborers that the seven Chinese 
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managers hire for $1-2 USD a day even though the farm makes as much as 
$400 000 USD a year.77
Li’s late husband, Wang Chi, worked in the Sino-Zambian Friendship 
Farm in the early 1990s. At one point, Zhongguo Agricorp decided to invest 
independently, so with an initial investment of $220 000 USD, the company 
bought the 3573-hectare farm in 1993 and Wang left Sino-Zambia Friendship 
Farm for the new Jonken Farm (a Chinese abbreviation of Zhongguo 
Agricorp). Although Wang passed away in 2005, Jonken Farm remained 
successful with an annual business volume of $3 million USD, 1000 cattle, 2000 
pigs, 120 000 chickens, and also 200 local employees all under Li’s care. The 
People’s Daily measures Li’s decade-long contribution to Zambia in terms of the 
7000 jobs she has created, the 14000 people for whom she provides housing, 
the interest that she pays on her $150 000 USD loan, and the free medical 
services she supplies that have helped thousands of locals. 
Much of this “help” is, however, contentious. Li’s “contribution” must 
be framed in China’s indirect terms of “help”: by raising product for the local 
market, Jonken improves the local food supply, and by hiring local hands, it 
alleviates local unemployment problems. Since Jonken has approximately 
200 regular employees, the quoted 7000 jobs likely includes every part-time 
position available on the farm in the past 10 years. Zambian laws require 
employers to provide housing and health services for employees and their 
families, so the 14 000 beneficiaries should thank the Zambian state, not Li’s 
benevolence. The interest Li pays on her $150 000 loan is not so much an aide 
as it is a debtor fulfilling an obligation to the bank. Furthermore, although The 
People’s Daily found someone anonymous to call Li an “angel,”78 her employees 
consider her a tyrant. Contrary to the Chinese media’s depiction, laborers 
fear Li and Wang even recalls the process of tempering her to be less fierce 
to their employees.79
Chinese capitalism in Africa came with unabashed racism. The People’s 
Daily, Li, and Wang all refer to Zambian laborers as “blacks” rather than 
“Zambians”. When the media came to film the farm workers’ relatively low 
living standards, Wang made no attempts to hide his sense of superiority. He 
stated that “these black people [….] usually steal from us. [T]hey stick to my 
enterprise like lice. [….] I am like a father to them.”80 Jonken is not alone in 
its attitude toward locals. Although famous PRC scholar Lu Ting-en reminds 
Chinese investors that Africans are very sensitive to racism because of their 
colonial history,81 few Chinese in Africa have heeded his advice. Even the 
Chinese-run hotel where I stayed in Zambia does not welcome African guests 
because they are perceived as dirty. In light of these stereotypes, it is easy 
to see that part of Li’s so-called heroism comes from being cast as a poor 
widow toiling in backward Africa fending for herself amidst throngs of African 
men. 
In actuality, Chinese investors like Li and most other businesspeople stay 
in Africa for monetary, not altruistic purposes and so their management skills 
are no different than from their Western predecessors. Although Mao once 
used the West as foil for China’s commitment to Africa, Chinese investors 
think exactly like Western capitalists. The West’s concept of market expansion 
is the major target of this model farm. “Compared with the West, Jonken 
is not large enough,”82 Li says, “in agricultural cooperation with Africa, the 
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PRC government should cooperate with small investors in order to enhance 
Chinese enterprises’ influence in local agriculture.”83
Li is not the sole voice asking for more governmental participation 
in China-Africa investment. The success stories of Chinese businessmen 
construct Africa as an ideal emigration destination for Chinese peasants 
because of its relative abundance of land, uncompetitive locals, and the 
possibility to substantially relieve Chinese population and food pressures. 
Recently, a Chinese Ministry of Commerce study combined notions of aid, 
immigration, and commerce and encouraged the idea of “technological 
demonstration families”— that is, Chinese peasants running a profitable 
farm as a means to demonstrate farm management to African locals. Like 
Li’s story, this study also suggested that the Chinese government intervene 
and use official Chinese aid to increase competition in Chinese agribusi-
ness in Africa, and, for instance, “assist” Africa by building roads to Chinese 
farms.84
Conclusion
China might be Africa’s best friend because Beijing chooses business 
instead of charity85, but the side effects of pure business in Africa include flas-
hbacks to colonialism and racism in the Sino-Africa context, as demonstra-
ted by Li’s “touching” idyll. Contrary to China’s once-altruistic and generous 
aid principles, current agricultural assistance projects are cost-cutting and 
focused on the bottom line. In essence, China seeks to resolve the African 
food problem by selling Chinese products. In the past, the Chinese taught 
Africans agricultural skills and built irrigation systems for free; now, Africa must 
pay to access Chinese technical knowledge. The Sino-Africa agricultural rela-
tionship is therefore a commercial one, but couched in terms of “coopera-
tion” and “mutual-benefit” whereby Africans buy food from Chinese farming 
entrepreneurs and China increases its market share in Africa while easing its 
domestic population pressure. 
On a macro-level, China indirectly assists Africa with its food supply 
difficulties and earns the fashionable image of being a pioneer of the “Trade 
Not Aid” movement. Vital to China’s Africa policy, large private investments 
such as Jonken provide the same benefits to China’s international image 
as agricultural assistance projects. These private farms fit China’s “spend 
less and diversify” bill exactly: with economies of scale, they are able to 
have sizeable harvests, afford better technology, hire more local workers, 
and promulgate the rhetoric of Chinese altruism toward Africa with greater 
efficiency than smaller state-funded projects. 
Curiously, China does not consider all of its investors as aid envoys 
when their businesses turn a profit. When China conducts business with the 
West, it does not purport to be “helping” or “benefitting” Westerners. Only 
when China engages with Africa do commercial measures morph into aid 
programs so charitable that they “touch” Africans on an emotional level. 
This paternalistic spin on Chinese business investments in Africa exposes the 
racist condescension of Chinese towards Africans. This manifestation of 
“Trade Not Aid” explains why Chinese investors are always reported to be 
“helping Africa” but also the targets wherever there is social unrest in Africa. 
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Although economic theory claims that trade brings mutual benefits, as the 
revolts against Chinese in Zambian copper mines signal, social unrest may 
arrive before wealth. Driven by capitalism and saturated with racism, the 
contemporary Sino-Africa cooperation model replicates the colonial system 
from whose shackles Chinese help initially sought to liberate Africa. 
References :
1.  See in Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2009).
2. Ibid, pp. 98-113.
3.  This paper is based on a 42-min interview that was broadcasted on November 7, 2004 by “Chinatown”—a program by Phoenix 
TV. An incomplete but similar written version of this interview can be seen at http://www.xiaoshuo.com/readbook/00162763_
23076.html (accessed September 22, 2010).
4.  Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 254.
5.  Serge Michel and Michel Beuret: China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa (New York: Nation Books, 2009), 
p. 18. 
6.  See the English version from PRC Foreign Ministry website: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18001.htm (accessed 
September 22, 2010)
7.  Maxwell Owusu, “Agriculture and Rural Development since 1935”, in Ali Mazrui (ed.), Africa since 1935 (UNESCO, 1999), 
p. 317. 
8.  K. Y. Amoako, Transforming Africa: An Agenda for Action (United Nations Publications, 2005), p.39. Amoako was the 
Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa from 1995 to 2005. He says around a third of African population 
suffered from malnutrition—exactly the same figure as it was 30 years ago, though 100 million more in terms of the number 
of people. 
9.  See Yuan Wu, China and Africa (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2008), p. 57, and Yun Wenju, “Cong Yuanzhu Dao 
Hezuo Kaifa” (From Assistance to Cooperative Exploration), in Zhongguo Yu Feizhou (China and Africa) (Peking University 
Press, 2000), p 303. 
10.  See in PRC Foreign Ministry Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya Editorial Board, Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao 
Shenya (Lives of Contemporary Chinese Diplomats) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1995), vol 5, p.394. 
11. Yun Wenju, 306.
12.  Guo Jinan and Wu Jun, Chushi Feizhou De Suiyue (Years of Diplomatic Posts in Africa) (Sichuan Publishing Group, 2006), 
p. 73.
13.  PRC Foreign Ministry Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya Editorial Board, Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya, 
vol 3, p.73. 
14.  Shi Mingyuan, “Qianpao Hongming Ban Qinlu” (Bombing Melody) in Wang Yi (ed), Zhanhuozhong de Zhongguo 
Waijiaoguan (Chinese Diplomats in Wars) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 1999), p.200. 
15. Brautigam 232-233.
16.  Tian Ye, “Zhongguo Keji Fazhan Huiji Feizhou Guojia” (Chinese techniques benefit Africa) (http://big5.xinhuanet.com/
gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-11/30/content_10434618.htm, accessed September 22, 2010) and Godwin 
Muhwezi-Bonge, “Uganda: Country’s Bet on Rice Begins to Payoff” ( http://allafrica.com/stories/200810280325.html, accessed 
September 22, 2010)
17. Yuan Wu, p. 59.
18.  Wang Yizhou, Zhongguo Duiwai Guanxi Zhuanxin Sanshinian (Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations 
in China, 1978-2008) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008), p. 143. 
19. Ibid, p. 150
16 How China’s “ Trade Not Aid ” Strategy Became Construed As Charitable Help
20.  Tim Cocks, “Uganda president calls for Africa trade, not aid,” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL29758179._CH_.2400, 
accessed on September 23, 2009.
21.  See in PRC Foreign Ministry Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya Editorial Board, Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao 
Shenya, vol 5, p. 191-192. 
22. Ibid, p. 150.
23. Yun Wenju, 305.
24.  Chen Shun, “Zhongfei Caoyuan Daohuaxian” (Rice Fragrance in Central Africa) (http://info.china.alibaba.com/news/detail/
v2-d5040356.html, accessed on September 23, 2009), and Department of Agriculture of Guanxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, 
“Dao Zhongguo Yuan Zhongfei Nongchang Diaoyan” (Investigating Chinese-assisted Farms in Central African Republic 
(http://www.gxny.gov.cn/web/2009-08/252912.htm, accessed on September 23, 2009)
25.  PRC Foreign Ministry Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya Editorial Board, Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya, 
vol 5, 205
26.  Serge Michel and Michel Beuret: China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa, p.3
27. Yun Wenju, 307
28.  See Ying Wei, “Yolan Kobar Nongchang” (Visiting Koba Farm) (http://www.africawindows.com/html/feizhouzixun/mingren-
mingtie/20070912/12928_4.shtml, accessed on September 23, 2009), and He Jiazheng, “Zhongji Kobar Nonchang Fangwenji” 
(Visiting Sino-Guinea Kobar Farm) (http://www.people.com.cn/9801/22/current/newfiles/i1010.html, accessed on September 
23, 2009. This paper was originally published on People’s Daily January 22, 1998, page 9)
29.  For problems large Chinese agricultural projects confronted in Africa, see Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Aid and African 
Development: Exporting Green Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998)
30.  See the announcement on January 28, 2008 from PRC Ministry of Agriculture http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Html/2009_
03_30/2_1882_2009_03_30_3675.html, accessed on September 23, 2009. According to attached file, the first condition for 
technicians is to have “good political quality.”
31.  See http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/ShowPost.aspx?PostID=822 and http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/ShowPost.
aspx?PostID=918 (accessed on September 23, 2009)
32.  See this website in http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/default.aspx?ForumGroupID=2 (accessed on September 23, 
2009)
33.  See in http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/ShowPost.aspx?PostID=778(accessed on April 23, 2009)
34.  For example, see An Chunying, “Reflections on the Promotion of Sino-African Cooperation in Tapping Africa’s Land 
Resources,” West Asia and Africa (Beijing: Institute of West African and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), 
No 5, 1999, pp 61-65. An Chunying considers moving Chinese farmers a mutual-benefit strategy because it would help ease 
Chinese food and land pressure while helping African food supply. 
35.  See http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Forums/ShowPost.aspx?PostID=763 (accessed on April 23, 2009)
36. Ibid 
37.  See http://bbs1.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView=1&id=97677921&boardId=1(accessed on 
April 23, 2009).The poster is Geng. 
38.  Philip Snow, The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa ( London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), p. 206. 
39.  M. Dujon Johnson, Race and Racism in the Chinas: Chinese Racial Attitude toward Africans and African-Americans 
(Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2007), p.14-15.
40.  Liu Yuanchao, “Yiyu de Meili—Shilun Gudai Zhongguoren de Feizhouguan” “The Charm of Foreign Lands—On Ancient 
Chinese Views of Africa”, in Center for African Studies, Peking University, ed., Zhongguo yu Feizhou (China and Africa) 
(Peking University Press, 2000), p.243.The meaning of “devil” (gui) is derogatory and expresses various degrees of hostility 
toward foreigners, treating them as “unhuman.” See in Sun Long-kee, “Contemporary Chinese Culture: Structure and 
Emotionality,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No 26 (July 1991), p. 6. 
41.  See in Frank Dikotter, p. 82, and Song Dehua, “Xindalu Yoji yu Lian Qichao de Meiguo Guan” (Trip to the New Continent 
and Lian Qichao’s American Views), Journal of Jinan University, Vol 17, No 3 (July 1995) , p. 83. 
42.  Frank Dikotter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 68.
43.  Kang Youwei, Datong Shu (Toward World Unity) (Shen Yang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), p 137-144, 
44.  Frank Dikotter, p. 15, 38-39, 82, 89, 149
 Philip Hsiaopong Liu 17
45.  Minutes, “Mao Zedong meeting African Visitors” (March 7, 1960), #102-00036-03, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives 
(hereafter MOFAA).
46.  Alan Hutchison, China’s African Revolution (Boulder: Westview, 1975) p 179.
47.  Philip Snow, pp. 192-194.
48.  Emmanuel John Hevi, An African Student in China (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 187.
49.  “Foreign Student Situation” (April 16 1963), issued by the PRC Ministry of Education, in Situation of Students from Cameroon 
and other Countries in China, from April 16, 1963 to Nov 19, 1963, # 108-00874-03, MOFAA.
50. Philip Snow, 199.
51.  See in Michael J. Sullivan, “The 1988-89 Nanjing Anti-African Protests: Racial Nationalism or National Racism,” China Quarterly, 
No 138 (June 1994), pp. 438-457. 
52. M. Dujon Johnson, p. 41.
53.  Barry Sautman, “Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao Africa,” China Quarterly, No 138, (June 1994) 415.
54.  Michael J. Sullivan, 446-451. This term “hei gui“ (black devil) is similar to the meaning of nigger, and the meaning of “gui” 
(devil) is derogatory and expresses various degrees of hostility toward foreigners by treating them as inhuman.
55.  Michael J. Sullivan, 445
56.  M. Dujon Johnson, 41. 
57.  David Holley, “Africans Press China on Student Dispute, ” Los Angeles Times, January 05, 1989 (http://articles.latimes.
com/1989-01-05/news/mn-300_1_african-students, accessed on September 6, 2010). 
58. See Barry Sautman, pp. 417-425, Michael J. Sullivan, p. 445
59. China Safari, pp. 14, 42-43
60.  Ma Fongzhou, Song Zaiyan, Zeng Xianding, and Lu Xianzhi, Haiwai Jishu Hezuo Gongzuo Tiaozheng Ji Gaijin Jihua (Overseas 
Technical Cooperation: Work Adjustment and Improvement Plan) , March 1, 1985. This is an official document provided by 
Taiwan’s Swaziland Agricultural Mission.
61  See the website of PRC Embassy in Malawi http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/mw.china-embassy.org/chn/sghdhzxxx/
t569617.htm, September 27, 2010)
62.  The news of benefitting 50000 peasants is broadcasted around China such as “Zhongguo Zhen Chenwei Malawi Zuizhongyao 
de Fazhan Huoban” (China gradually becomes Malawi’s most important development partner) (http://news.cctv.com/
china/20081228/101594.shtml, accessed on September 27, 2010). For academic work, see Paliani Chinguwo, Chinese 
Investments in Malawi, in Anthony Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch (eds), Chinese Investment in Africa: A Labor Perspective, 
(African Labor Research Network, 2009) pp 277-278.
63.  See respectively in PRC Foreign Ministry Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie Waijiao Shenya Editorial Board, Dangdai Zhongguo Shijie 
Waijiao Shenya, Vol 6, p.214, Vol 5, p.44, and Vol 6, p234.
64.  See an interview with PRC Ambassador to Malawi http://www.cottonchina.org/news/pubzmb.php?articleid=96062&news
time=2010-02-20 (accessed on September 27, 2010)
65.  See the announcement from China Volunteers’ website http://www.zgzyz.org.cn/volunteer/content.jsp?id=68676 (accessed 
on September 27, 2010)
66.  See the website of Economic and Commercial Councilor’s Office of the PRC Embassy in Malawi, http://malawi.mofcom.
gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200908/20090806470652.html?832432424=167975155 (accessed on September 28, 2010)
67.  See the website of PRC Embassy in Malawi, http://big5.fmprc.gov.cn/gate/big5/mw.china-embassy.org/chn/sghdhzxxx/
t606130.htm (accessed on September 28, 2010) 
68.  “TIMAU: Chinese insults ….Etta Banda consider Angola,” Nyasatimes, Sep 13, 2009, (http://www.nyasatimes.com/columns/
timau-chinese-insults-etta-banda-consider-angola.html/comment-page-2, accessed on September 28, 2010)
69.  See in http://cityway2008.blog.sohu.com/rss (accessed on September 28, 2010)
70.  Lameck Masina, “Chinese Envoy’s Remarks on Malawi Breed Resentment,” Voice of America, March 28, 2008, the original 
was from http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-03/2008-03-28-voa36.cfm, now this news still available in http://
storiesonmalawi.blogspot.com/2008/03/chinese-envoys-remarks-on-malawi-breed.html (accessed on April 28, 2010), the 
Chinese version of this report can be seen at http://wwwga.epochtimes.com/gb/8/3/29/n2063097.htm (accessed on 
September 28, 2010).
18 How China’s “ Trade Not Aid ” Strategy Became Construed As Charitable Help
71.  “Malawi should shun western media reports on Dalai Lama – Chinese envoy,” Nyasatimes, Sep 2, 2009 ( http://www.nyasa-
times.com/national/malawi-should-shun-western-media-reports-on-dalai-lama-%E2%80%93-chinese-envoy.html, accessed 
on September 28, 2010)
72.  See http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=134323394 (Accessed on September 28, 2010) 
73.  See the announcement of PRC embassy in Zambia (http://zm.chineseembassy.org/chn/lsfw/lsxw/t622378.htm) and Serge 
Michel, “Chinois en Zambie,” Le Monde,October 24, 2008 (http://www.lemonde.fr/le-monde-2/article/2008/10/24/chinois-
en-zambie-l-amitie-entre-les-peuples-sauce-aigre-douce_1110878_1004868.html, accessed on September 28, 2010)
74.  Rong Song ,“Yoyi Hezuo de Shifan” (A model of Friendly Cooperation) Xinhua News Agency, Feb 18, 2003, ( http://www1.
peopledaily.com.cn/BIG5/shizheng/20030218/925541.html, accessed on September 28, 2010)
75.  See China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation’s website http://www.cnadc.com.cn/News/2007/9/vc4rk-
tajog.htm (Accessed on September 28, 2010)
76.  See PRC Embassy in the UK website http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t274346.htm (Accessed on 
September 28, 2010) 
77.  See PRC Ministry of Agriculture website http://www.fecc.agri.gov.cn/contents/28/361.html (Accessed on September 28, 
2010)
78.  This report was on People’s Daily overseas edition of Dec 9, 2006, http://hi.people.com.cn/2006/12/09/279117.html (accessed 
on September 28, 2010)
79. See reference 3. 
80. Ibid. 
81.  Lu Ting-en, “Opinions on Further Developing Sino-African Agricultural Investment and Cooperation,” West Asia and Africa 
(Institute of West African and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), No 1, 2003, p 13.
82. See in http://news.cctv.com/china/20080615/101728.shtml (accessed on September 28, 2010) 
83.  See the PRC Ministry of Commerce website http://guyuanshi.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zhongyaozt/200610/20061003457660.
html (accessed on April 28, 2010) 
84.  For this study, please see Wang Chenyan” Dui Feizhou Nongye Yuanzhu Xinxinshi Tansuo” (Exploring new models to assist 
Africa), in Guoji Jingji Hezuo (International Economic Cooperation) (Beijing: Chinese Academy of International Trade and 
Economic Cooperation), No 4, 2008 (See in http://qkzz.net/MAGAZINE/1002-1515/2008/04/2547206.htm accessed on 
September 28, 2010); for other Chinese news report see in http://www.singtaonet.com/china/200903/t20090312_994631.
html； http://www.nongji.com.cn/news/viewNews.action?newsId=31277 ；http://news.qq.com/a/20070426/001990.htm 
(accessed on September 28, 2010).
85.  Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, pp. 98-113. 
